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This thesis presents a proposal for the integration of
United States Coast Guard computer networks with the Defense
Data Network. The hardware and software functional
requirements for the merger are based upon a thorough
understanding of packet switching and the layering of
communications protocols. Results indicate that it is
possible to form a hierarchical networking architecture by
joining Coast Guard local-area and regional networks with
the long-haul services of the Defense Data Network. Thus,
computer users at each Coast Guard command level will be
able to invoke a variety of applications ranging from the
handling of traditional military message traffic to the





B. THE PROBLEM 11
C. THE APPROACH 13
II. THE DEFENSE DATA NETWORK 15
A. PHYSICAL VIEW 15
B. LOGICAL VIEW 25
III. COAST GUARD COMPUTER NETWORKS 32
A. OPENING REMARKS 32
B. OPERATIONS COMPUTER CENTER (OCC) 33
C. MARINE SAFETY INFORMATION SYSTEMS (MSIS) — 35
D. ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS 38
E. TRADITIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 39
F. COAST GUARD LOCAL AREA NETWORKS 46
G. THE NEED FOR AN INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE — 49
IV. RECOMMENDED DDN ACCESS PLAN 54
A. PURPOSE 54
B. INTRACOMMAND ACCESS 55
C. INTERCOMMAND ACCESS 56
D. INTERSERVICE ACCESS 61
E. PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS 62

V. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 64
A. THE NEED FOR FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 64
B. HARDWARE 66
C. SOFTWARE 72
1. The Importance of Protocols 72
2. The 1822 Protocol 75
3. The Internet Protocol 75
4. The Transmission Control Protocol 77
5. The File Transfer and TELNET Protocols - 79
6. The Internetworking of Coast Guard/DDN
Software 80
D. SECURITY AND IMPLEMENTATION TIMETABLE 89
VI. CONCLUSIONS 92
APPENDIX A DEFENSE DATA NETWORK HARDWARE COST 94
APPENDIX B INTERNET PROTOCOL FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATION 98
APPENDIX C TRANSMISSION CONTROL PROTOCOL FUNCTIONAL
SPECIFICATION 101
LIST OF REFERENCES 104
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 107

LIST OF TABLES
I. The Seven International Standards Organization
Layers 26
II. The Differences Between a Virtual Circuit and a
Datagram 29
III. A Brief Outline of the Types of Commands Found
in Coast Guard Long-Haul Networks 34
IV. Current Status of Coast Guard AUTODIN I
Installations 43
V. Coast Guard Commands that are Recommended for
Access to the Defense Data Network 61






The Structure of a Computer Communications
Network 1
6
2. A Simple Model of Packet Switching 18
3. A Packet Switched Path Between Two Hosts 21
4. The Scope of the Defense Data Network 23
5. End-to-End Encryption 24
6. The Interaction of Protocols Within the ISO
Model 27
7. TELENET 36
8. The Interim MSIS 37
9. The Information System Network 40
10. AUTODIN Access 42
11. The ODIN Network 45
12. The Secure Command and Control Network 47
13. Coast Guard Information Resources Management
Architecture 50
14. Coast Guard Districts 58
15. DDN Access Hardware 67
16. A Typical Example of a Coast Guard Multiple Network
Connection • 72
17. A Coast Guard Regional Network 83
18. Internet Datagram Showing Fields of IP Header, TCP
Header and LAN Message Which are Relevent to Add-
ressing 85
19. An Internet Datagram 86
8

20. The Coast Guard/DDN Internetworking Connections -- 88
21
.
The Safeguards to Support Security and Privacy
Features 90
22. Example Internet Datagram Header 98




The Defense Data Network (DDN) represents an attempt to
apply state-of-the-art technology to provide an effective
long-haul computer network. This effort has at its
foundation a concept developed in the early seventies called
packet switching. The U.S. Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) is credited with performing much of
the initial research and development that will make DDN
possible. DARPA was successfully able to demonstrate the
credibility of packet switching as a means of computer
telecommunications through a network that would eventually
be known as the ARPANET [Ref.1: p. 4], The ARPANET
transcended its initial experimental nature to become a
viable, operational means of exchanging communications
between heterogeneous computer systems. For the first time,
it became convenient and economical for computers with
different operating systems, made by different
manufacturers, to share resources on a large scale basis.
The results of a research project do not directly lead
to the same findings in a non-controlled environment. The
ARPANET is continuously undergoing revision. Many of the
theoretical ideas that dealt with the network were found to
be inadequate when put into practice and have consequently
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been modified or replaced. The Department of Defense (DOD)
has determined however, that an approach similar to the
ARPANET can be used to meet the computer networking needs of
the armed forces. Consequently, the contract for the second
generation of the Automated Digital Network (AUTODIN II) was
terminated in favor of further development of ARPANET
concepts to form DDN [Ref. 2: p. 1]. The results of these
decisions will not be known until 1986 when DDN becomes
fully operational.
B. THE PROBLEM
The United States Coast Guard is a subscriber to the
AUTODIN system (AUTODIN I). The Chief of U.S. Naval
Operations has requested that the Coast Guard define its
computer networking requirements so that the Coast Guard may
become a subscriber to the replacement Defense Data Network.
DDN will provide data communication services that extend
beyond the handling of traditional military message traffic
to the processing of all forms of computer data. This means
that the Coast Guard has the opportunity to take advantage
of these new services to vastly improve the capability of
its own network architecture.
The Coast Guard has also pursued the integration of
multiple types of information through common networks. This
effort has proceeded independently of Defense Data Network
development. The major theme of this thesis is to resolve
11

those issues surrounding the incorporation of DDN into the
Coast Guard's overall networking structure. It is
theoretically possible for the Coast Guard to meet all of
its data communications needs through the integration of
networks developed by the service and the Defense Data
Network. The overriding concern is that Coast Guard data
exchanges take place in the most effective and efficient
manner possible. This implies that network boundaries be
appropriately defined and the transmission of data between
networks be achieved in a timely and error free fashion.
The result is a comprehensive, hierarchical network
architecture that allows all Coast Guard users to process
computer applications. It should be noted that this thesis
deals with applying the latest theoretical networking
advances to make the architecture possible. There is no
intention to profess that the findings herein will directly
lead to an operational solution to all networking
difficulties. This is particularly true in the area of
software development for multiple network compatibility.
However, this thesis may serve as an excellent starting
point for additional research, testing, and evaluation. The
fact that the Coast Guard is a relatively small service,
with a dedication to implementing the most recent computer
technological discoveries, creates fascinating opportunities




This effort is intended primarily for high level
decision makers who must respond to the request of the Chief
of Naval Operations regarding Coast Guard DDN use. One
assumption is that the reader is familiar with the basic
purpose and procedures of military communications networks
before the advent of the Defense Data Network. However, in
an academic sense, one may also be able to gain valuable
insight into state-of-the-art computer networking principles
by comprehending all, or part, of this thesis. A brief
description of format is presented to assist readers of
either category above.
Section II contains a discussion of packet switching as
it applies to the Defense Data Network. The most
fundamental computer networking concepts are presented from
both a physical and logical perspective. This is so the
reader has a basic understanding of how DDN will accomplish
its networking functions as well as outline the most
elementary subscriber requirements. Section III describes
the origin and extent of Coast Guard computer networks. The
accent is upon the service's types of applications, data
communications capabilities and overall information
processing philosophy. These two sections combine to form
the basis for a DDN access plan for the U.S. Coast Guard.
This issue is explored from the intracommand, intercommand
and interservice viewpoints in Section IV. Once the access
13

plan is established, the emphasis of the thesis shifts to a
discussion of implementation issues. The hardware,
software, and security requirements are described that can
make the proposed network architecture a reality. The main
focus of this Section V is on the use and determination of
functional requirements and specifications. Finally, the
Conclusion section outlines the overall results and
observations. Here, also, an attempt is made to point out
the additional development needed to transform the program
plan into an operational networking scheme.
14

II. THE DEFENSE DATA NETWORK
A. PHYSICAL VIEW
Packet switching is the most fundamental concept used in
the DDN. Figure 1 represents the structure of a typical
computer-communication network [Ref. 3: p. 321]. This is by
definition, an interconnection of several computers or a set
of terminals connected to one or more computers [Ref. 4:
p. 12]. There are two basic processing operations which
occur in any such network. The black circles represent
switching computers called nodes (In ARPANET and DDN these
are called interface message processors (IMPs). The entire
collection of nodes represent the communications sub-network
or backbone. This is the mechanism by which remote computer
facilities exchange data. The square blocks represent
HOSTS. The term host can have two meanings. DDN generally
regards a host as a device that can provide access to the
sub-network. In addition a host may contain the user's
applications programs. The user's interface with the
network is through terminals (the small open circles).
Figure 1 demonstrates the various ways hosts, nodes, and
terminals can be interconnected to form the network.
Adjoining point to point connectors between IMPs or between
hosts and IMPs are known as links. An important aspect of
this type of network topology is that it relies on the store
15

and forward principle. Each IMP must have the ability to
accept incoming data, perform internal processing and then
send the information to the next processing point [Ref. 5:
p.8]. The advantages of this technique will be pointed out









Switching node or IMP
Computer host
Terminal
Figure 1 . The Structure of a Computer Communications
Network
Experience has shown that computer communications is a
"bursty" process rather than a smooth flow of traffic. The
beauty of packet switching is that it is not necessary to
16

physically establish a path, send the data stream and then
close the circuit when the transmission is finished.
Instead, the store and forward capability of the network can
be utilized to send packets that are finite sequences of
bits comprised of three main parts; a header, data and a
means of error control. They are most often associated with
internal subnetwork (or backbone network) operations and are
not detectable to the user [Ref. 6: p. 1387], Since each
node is a programmable computer, the path a particular
packet travels need not be dedicated. It is therefore
possible to share network resources to the best advantage.
Elaborate decisions regarding the handling of packets can be
made and high speed trunks in the backbone may handle host
requirements under most conditions [Ref. 1: pp. 2-3]. These
advantages do not come without a price. Packet switched
networks require complex routing and switching to be made.
This thesis will focus specifically upon DDN network
procedures. Many of these are a direct result of lessons
learned from the ARPANET.
One of the basic issues in packet switching is ensuring
that a packet is correctly transmitted and received between
IMPS. Figure 2 is a simple model of how this is accomplished
[Ref. 1: p. 2]. Each link contains an acknowledgment scheme.
The receiving node analyzes, the check sum part of the
packet and transmits an acknowledgment to the sender if all
is well. The Defense Data network employs a sixteen bit
17

Cyclical Redundancy Code (CRC) for error checking [Ref. 7:
p.106]. Polynominal division is performed on the checksum
and a non-zero remainder implies an error. Packets are to
be retransmitted whenever an error occurs. Note that the
figure indicates that a switch may be called upon to handle







Figure 2. A Simple Model of Packet Switching
The routing of packets is another important considera-
tion. Since each packet can move about the network
independently it must contain the required address(es).
This information is a part of the header. (There is a
18

multitude of information contained in a DDN packet header.
This will be discussed in much greater detail later.
Suffice it to say at this point that each packet contains,
as a minimum, source and destination computer address.)
There are numerous routing algorithms for networks with
several improvements coming about as a result of greater
experience. DDN will utilize the following type of scheme:
each node will contain information on network topology and
line delays. Periodically a node will measure its
particular line delay and transmit this information to all
other nodes. As a result each IMP will contain updated
routing information and can move packets about the network
accordingly [Ref. 8: p. 71 2]. This is an example of adaptive
or dynamic routing. The network attempts to change in a
real-time fashion to circumvent or minimize delays.
Congestion control is also related to decreasing delay
times. There are two inherent dangers to packet switched
networks: 1) numerous incoming packets arriving
simultaneously could flood into an IMP causing an overflow;
2) a malfunctioning IMP can overload the network with
erroneous packets, preventing the flow of valid data. The
Defense Data Network attempts to resolve the first problem
through the use of windows and choke packets. A window is
merely a specified limit to the number of send and receive
sequences that a particular IMP can handle at any given time
(thus preventing buffer overflow). Each node also has the
19

ability to reduce or cutoff the amount of incoming traffic
by issuing a choke packet to its partner at the sending end
of a link [Ref. 5: p. 150]. A choke packet is then another
internal mechanism much like the routing update packet
generated for network control.
The second difficulty is handled in an easy fashion.
Packets are allowed to exist in the network for a maximum of
4.25 minutes [Ref. 7: p. 179]. After this period they are
automatically destroyed. Naturally there must be some
mechanism to prevent the destruction of valid data. This
method will be discussed in later sections.
The complete end-to-end flow of data communications is
termed a path [Ref. 9: p. 12]. Figure 3 points out a typical
data communications path between two hosts.
The attempt of the discussion thus far has been to:
1. Introduce the concept of packet switching.
2. Understand the basic terminology and fundamentals of
computer networking.
3. Provide a sample explanation of how the Defense Data
Network accomplishes acknowledgment, error checking,
routing, and congestion control.
Although exhaustive exposition of these topics is beyond
the scope of this thesis, it will be necessary to expound on
some of these ideas during the examination of the problem of
connecting the U.S. Coast Guard to DDN. Of particular
importance will be the addressing and other information
required in packet headers. This topic is of prime






rnT] Packet Switching Node
flTH Network Interlace
Figure 3. A Packet Switched Path Between Two Hosts
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A synopsis of the physical aspects of the Defense Data
Network and a description of its basic hardware components
based on information contained in the Defense Data Network
Program Plan, January 1982, is summarized below.
It has been demonstrated that the IMP or switching node
is a key element for packet switched networks. The DDN will
utilize a Bolt Barenek and Newman C/30 microprogrammed
minicomputer as an IMP. The subnetwork or backbone for the
initial phase (DDNI) implementation will consist of 171 of
these devices located at about 85 sites as shown in Figure 4
[Ref. 7: pp. 3-4].
Plans call for ninety-one subscriber systems that will
consist of 488 hosts and 1446 terminals. These figures
represent direct connect access only [Ref. 7: p. 3].
Terminals will be able to access DDN through a unit
called a mini-TAC. The mini-TAC can support up to 16
asynchronous terminals. DDNI will contain 222 of these
units. (Remember in Department of Defense terminology a
host is a device which allows access to the network. Mini-
TACS can therefore be considered as "hosts"). [Ref. 7: p.5]
Security will be handled by two basic units, the
Internet Private Line Interface (IPLI) and the KG-84 crypto
device. These devices will be connected in the manner shown
in Figure 5. Various key lists will be able to partition
distinct user communities. [Ref. 7: pp. 3-4]
22
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Figure 5. End-to-End Encryption
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Network status is checked at Network Monitoring Centers
using a BBN C/70. Sixteen operators can check the status,
topology and throughput of up to 250 IMPS providing
extensive network management [Ref. 7: pp.2-3].
Other possible requirements are statistical multiplexers
to combine asynchronous terminal inputs and/or high speed
modems to communicate via leased lines.
A cost breakdown of these hardware devices is contained
in section 4.5.2 of the DDN Program Plan and is presented as
Appendix A.
B. LOGICAL VIEW
Computer networks are much more than a set of inter-
connected black boxes. There are several key ingredients
that have yet to be addressed. Perhaps the most basic issue
is the method for transmitting packets throughout the
network. Three distinct processes are in fact involved to
accomplish this goal. First, there must be an access
process to gain entry into the sub-network. Second, a
communications process is required between the nodes forming
the sub-network and third, end to end control is required
since packets may travel over a variety of paths to reach
their final destination. To complicate matters further,
consider that the end user often desires to transfer
application files to a computer that has a different
operating system, file structures, etc. from that of the
25

originator. It would be impossible to resolve these
problems with a single hardware/software package. Network
designers have instead opted for a layering approach, that
is breaking down the total communications function into a
hierarchical set of modules. This closely resembles a top
down design approach to software design.
The International Standards Organization (ISO) has
defined seven layers for computer networking. The layer
names and a few examples of their functions are presented in
Table I [Ref . 10: p. 1 3 1 ]
.























Figure 6 illustrates how two computers with user
applications packages can communicate using the ISO model.
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La yer Name of unit
exchanged
Application protocol
7 Application Application Message
V Presentation protocol 4/
6 Presentation Presentation Message
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Figure 6. The Interaction of Protocols Within the ISO Model
[Ref. 5: p. 16] There are several points of interest here.
Notice that vertically, each layer relies directly on the
layer below. Horizontally, only the physical layer deals
with the physical transmission of data. All other
communications are virtual. That is, in the higher layers
there are no physical transmission lines. Instead,
protocols are used to give the impression of a connection
between the two hosts at each layer. A protocol can be
defined as a set of conventions or rules that allow two end
27

points to communicate [Ref. 6: p. 1387]. These end points
may be physical in nature or they may deal entirely with the
logical layering process described above.
There are two methods by which packets may travel
through a network called virtual circuit and datagram. A
virtual circuit is a logical channel between the source and
destination. An initial setup is required and packets are
delivered in the order sent [Ref . 1 1 : pp. 501-502]. A
virtual circuit is analogous to a typical telephone
conversation. The caller dials a phone number and a set-up
phase (connection establishment and ringing) is involved.
When the receiver picks up his phone, voice data is
transferred in a sequential manner until the connection is
closed (hang-up). [Ref. 5: p. 188] On the other hand, in a
datagram type of service, individual packets travel
unacknowledged in simple units throughout the sub-network.
Packets may arrive at the destination in an unsequenced
fashion. There is no set-up phase in a datagram service
[Ref. 5: p. 189]. A datagram can be compared to a letter in
the postal system. Each correspondence is an isolated,
addressed entity. [Ref. 5: p.189]. The differences between
virtual circuit and datagram services is given in Table II.
The key issue is to delineate the function of the host from
those which should reside in the sub-network.
The controversy as to which method is preferred in
computer networks rages on. It would appear that the short
28
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"burstyness" of computers would lend itself more favorably
to datagrams. However the sequential nature of
communication between sender and receiver suggests that
virtual circuits should be used. Notice also that the
differences between the two call for a corresponding
difference in the layering process. Virtual circuit service
corresponds more closely to the ISO model [Ref. 12: p. 1 2 8 ]
.
Originally the ARPANET was also designed as a virtual
circuit model. [Ref. 5: pp. 369-370] However, DARPA later
came to realize one major advantage to datagrams.
Individual packets could simultaneously be transmitted
throughout the sub-network over numerous channels. This
combined with the fact that set-up time is eliminated
29

offered tremendous speed advantages. Consequently, an
effort was begun that would depart from traditional ISO
philosophies in networking. Through the implementation of
two new protocols called the Internet Protocol (IP) and the
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), the ARPANET was
successfully able to establish a datagram type of service in
the sub-network (backbone) while providing sequencing in the
higher transport layer.
Meanwhile industry, (particularly the international
community) developed a virtual circuit protocol called X.25.
This protocol is entirely compatible with the physical, data
link, and network layers of the ISO model [Ref. 11: p. 508],
There are also provisions for datagrams in X.25 but
commercial availability of this service is extremely limited
[Ref. 1: p. 125].
The Department of Defense believes that military
requirements dictate the need for both datagram and virtual
circuit services [Ref. 12: p. 127]. The Defense Data
Network will eventually support X.25 as well as TCP and IP.
Nevertheless, DDN is doing everything in its power to
promote international acceptance of the datagram -based TCP
and IP protocols [Ref. 13: p. 1 1 6 ] . In fact, access to the
network will be denied without their installation. These
form the basis of invoking the remote job entry and file
transfer protocols at a higher level.
30

The consequences of this decision are of profound
importance to those attempting to utilize DDN. The Defense
Data Network is not a homogeneous means of interconnecting
computers. Rather, it is a bold effort designed to
interface numerous network communities. Communications
between hosts can be a result of any of the following:
1. simple bus structures.
2. virtual circuits (particularly X.25).
3. ARPANET (TCP, IP).
4. local area techniques (e.g., Ethernet).
The DDN proposes to be compatible with each of these
methods.
The challenge of this thesis is quite clear and rests in
three parts. First there is a need to examine the
networking capabilities of U.S. Coast Guard computer
resources. Next an understanding of the hierarchical
process of connecting local networks to DDN is required.
Finally, the functional requirements to achieve this
interconnection must be developed (particularly in the area
of required protocols). Only then can a comprehensive
program plan for the access and utilization of the Defense
Data Network by the U.S. Coast Guard be developed.
31

III. COAST GUARD COMPUTER NETWORKS
A. OPENING REMARKS
As little as ten years ago, the U.S. Coast Guard relied
almost solely upon traditional military communications
schemes to meet the service's networking needs. Radio nets,
the telephone and hard copy teletype message traffic were
the command and control mechanisms to fulfill both
operational and administrative mission requirements. During
the early seventies, the Coast Guard began to realize the
advantages of data-based management information and decision
support systems. Consequently, several specialized computer
networks were developed by various communities of interest
that were designed to perform unique mission functions.
Four long haul networks classifications emerged from this
effort. They are:
1. Operational Networks (Search and Rescue, Law
Enforcement )
.
2. Marine Safety Networks (Vessel Documentation,
Licensing)
.
3. Administrative Networks (Personnel and Finance).
4. Traditional Telecommunications Networks (Autodin).
In addition, numerous mini/micro computer local area
networks (LAN) sprang up to meet the word and data
processing needs at the unit level.
32

This section will describe the primary network in each
of these categories. A knowledge of the Coast Guard's
organizational structure may be required to understand the
rationale behind interconnections. Table III is included
for this purpose. One assumption is that the operational
requirements for these systems have been predetermined.
Therefore, issues that deal specifically with data content
or the inclusion/exclusion of a particular node will not be
discussed here. The main focus is on a functional inter-
connection approach and not the exact content of computer
telecommunications
.
B. OPERATIONS COMPUTER CENTER (OCC)
The Operations Computer Center is a centralized, real-
time information processing resource designed to provide
data base access or run sophisticated computer programs.
Here is a listing of some of the services provided by the
OCC [Ref. 14: pp. 1-9]:
1. Computer Aided Search Planning (CASP)-A mathematical
model for computer assisted search planning.
2. Automated Mutual-assistance Vessel Rescue System
(AMVRS)-A means of providing worldwide ship movement
tracking.
3. Operations Information System (OPINS)-A operational
information and resource inverting system.
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Redundant Prime 750 minicomputer systems are utilized
for the above purposes at a facility located at Governors
Island, New York. The OCC has X.25, Telenet, and Primenet
tele-processing system software for networking. Most
subscribers to the OCC use the commercial Telenet dial-in
capability to communicate with the Prime mainframe. Figure
7 points out the principle trunk lines of Telenet [Ref. 15:
pp. 11-14]. Since this network is largely oriented toward
search and rescue, the main users are Coast Guard District
Command Centers who dispatch rescue resources. In addition
to the services mentioned above, each District has a
reserved data storage space where unique application
packages may be developed.
C. MARINE SAFETY INFORMATION SYSTEM (MSIS)
When completed the Marine Safety Information System will
be a nationwide, comprehensive data base system with over
180 different data files dealing with commercial vessels,
their owners and activities. MSIS will provide real-time
information concerning, licensing and documentation [Ref.
14: pp. 1-9, 1-10]. A basing plan for seven MSIS mini
computers has yet to be fully developed. However, an
interim network has been established using primarily Coast
Guard units along the Gulf Coast. Figure 8 outlines the






Figure 8. The Interim MSIS
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The MSIS is also currently invoking Telenet's public
data network for telecommunications services. It is
therefore quite possible for some commands to access the OCC
and MSIS with equal ease. The only requirement is a real
need to tie into these data bases. MSIS promises to become
the most extensive long-haul network in the Coast Guard.
D. ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS
There are two major categories of administrative
computer systems in the Coast Guard. Transactions are
usually oriented either toward personnel and/or supply
matters and are conducted using the Personnel Management
System (ARMS) respectively. Each of these systems will be
discussed in further detail.
PMIS maintains a master file of all Coast Guard active
duty and reserve personnel. Data items include name, rank,
training, qualification codes, etc. During June of 1983 the
Coast Guard implemented a revised PMIS network.
Microprocessors equipped with X.25 telecommunications
software have the ability to access the extensive personnel
data base from larger mainframes. This marks the first
occasion where the Coast Guard may choose to invoke both the
X.25 protocol and distributive processing on a large scale
basis (the physical and logical attributes of this type of
connection will be discussed in Sections IV and V). PMIS
38

and supply data can be handled in a very similar fashion.
In fact, the same mainframes often control both data bases.
The development of ARMS closely parallels PMIS. The
purpose of ARMS is to provide supply personnel with an
automated system for requisitioning supplies as well as
monitoring the status of open requisitions. This will
eliminate the need for numerous hardcopy ordering forms used
in the past.
PMIS and ARMS are the major components of a network
loosely called the Information System by the Coast Guard.
Figure 9 shows the nodes and line speed of this network
[Ref. 15: p. 9-5]. The Information System are
organizational units comprised of Coast Guard Headquarters,
all district offices and the Military Pay Center. Eventually
it will handle nearly all of the service's administrative
matters requiring computers. The key to the success of this
venture is in the ability of minicomputers at each node to
download interactive applications file packages to
microprocessors. The first attempt at this is, of course,
PMIS as mentioned earlier.
E. TRADITIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
The Coast Guard is in a unique position with regard to
the handling of military message traffic. During
peacetime this service is not a part of the Department of
Defense and often employs non-DOD radio and teletype
39

Figure 9. The Information System Network
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networks. However, the Coast Guard does become a part of
the Department of the Navy during wartime and thus must
maintain full compatibility with Naval communications
systems. The result has been the formation of two principle
long haul telecommunications networks. On the one hand the
Coast Guard is currently a part of DOD's worldwide Autodin
system and at the same time it is in the process of
developing an intraservice Operational Digital Network
(ODIN). Each of these merit further explanation.
Figure 10 shows the Coast Guard's Autodin Access and
Table IV gives a brief outline of the status of Autodin
installations [Ref. 15: pp. 9-1, 9-4]. Almost all Autodin
hardware and software is provided to the Coast Guard through
arrangements made by the U.S. Navy. In turn, the Coast
Guard meets the receiving costs of operating their
installations. Since the Defense Data Network will replace
Autodin and compatibility must be maintained, it is certain
that, at the very minimum, the sites listed in Table IV will
be granted DDN access. Autodin has been described as the
Coast Guard's record message workhorse [Ref. 14: p. 1-7].
This was because intra-service message networks consisted of
slow (100 baud) teletype loops. It was often faster to use
Autodin to route traffic between Coast Guard Commands that
had access to the DOD network. Another constant necessity
is to relay messages by converting from Coast Guard teletype
to Autodin and vice-versa. Currently, this means a change
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Figure 10. AUTODIN Access
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Table IV. Current Status of Coast Guard AUTODIN I
Installations
RI UNIT SERVICE ASC REMARKS
RUEOABA CCGDONE MODE I SRT II 300 BAUD FT DIETRICK
BUCIHLA CCGDTWO MODE V 75 BAUD GENTILE TO BE REHOMED TO
SCOTT AFAMPE FY82
RUEDEEA CCGDTHP.ES MODE I SRT. II 300 BAUD HANCOCK
RUEBNSA CCGDFIVE MODE I SRT II 300 BAUD ANDREWS
RUCLFOA CCGDSZYSN MODE I SRT II 300 BAUD ALBANY
RUCLFWA CCGDEIGHT MODE I SRT II 300 BAUD ALBANY RUT B IN FY83
RUCIABA CCGDNINE MODE I SRT II 300 BAUD GENTILE
RUVJNJA CCSDZLSVSN MODE I SRT II 300 BAUD NORTON
BUWMHIA CCGDTWS1VE MODE I SRT II 300 BAUD McCLELLAN
RUWM7UA CCGDTHIRTEEN RUT B VIA LDMX
HTCC BANGOR
BUHHAGA CCGDFOURTEEN RETT 3 VTA LDMX
HTCC PEARL
HARBOR
RUWMDMA CCGDSEVENTEEN MODE V 75 BAUD McCLELLAN
RUSDQNA GICP MAID 300 BAUD HANCOCK
RUEBQWA SICP MAID 300 BAUD ANDREWS
RULLQLA AICP MAID 300 BAUD ALBANY
RUEDEPA COMMSTA BOSTON MODE I 150 BAUD HANCOCK MODEL 37 TTY
INTERFACE












MODE V WAS TO HAVE
BEEN INSTALLED IN
FY80. PENDS
RADSTA NEW ORLEANS NONE
RUWNSJA COMMSTA SAN FRAN NAVCOMPARS VIA NAVCOMMSTA
STOCKTON
NAVCOMPARS
OHCLAS NAVCOMPARS VIA NAVCAMS
WESTPAC
MODE V 75 BAUD McCLELLAN
MODE V 75 BAUD FT DIETRICK
MODE V 75 BAUD ANDREWS
MODE V 75 BAUD HANCOCK
MODE V 75 BAUD ANDREWS
TO BE UPGRADED TO
MODE I
TO BE UPGRADED TO




in routing format and the cutting of a paper tape.
Unfortunately, the only interface between Autodin and intra-
service teletype is via paper tape. One of the main
obstacles of automatic switching is that the majority of
Coast Guard teletype circuits are unclassified. This
presents a real security danger when classified traffic is
destined to Coast Guard commands through Autodin.
The outgrowth of the above situation was plans for the
establishment of ODIN. It was obvious that there are two
major problems with the message handling system as it
presently exists. First, intra-service networks were slow
and constantly congested. Second, the paper tape relay
process is extremely labor intensive. ODIN is a 1200 baud,
polled message system. Figure 11 outlines the extent of the
ODIN network. The circuits along the Atlantic Coast have
already been installed and are operational. When completed,
ODIN is to become the Coast Guard's primary means of
handling intra-service message traffic [Ref. 15: p. 5-1].
The system relies upon microprocessor technology to
accomplish polling, routing, header conversion, etc. One
additional objective of the ODIN project is to develop an
interface unit between ODIN and Autodin (even though Autodin
is to be replaced, it is necessary to link Coast Guard and
DOD networks by some means other than paper tape). ODIN is
an unclassified communications scheme. Plans are to
establish the Secure Command and Control Network (SCCN) to
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Figure 1 1 . The ODIN Network
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become the primary means of processing classified messages
in the Coast Guard. Figure 12 shows the interconnections of
SCCN [Ref. 15: p. 9-3], Together ODIN and SCCN will provide
a means for the service to handle all message traffic by
automatically routing to the appropriate communication
network ( s )
.
F. COAST GUARD LOCAL AREA NETWORKS
The decreasing cost of hardware has made it advantageous
for even the smallest commands to possess some form of
computer processing capability. One natural outgrowth of
this is the desire to the computer resources together. This
is true not only in the long-haul networking sense but also
on a localized level.
The Coast Guard recognized this need for all units to
acquire this standalone processing ability and at the same
time have the option to perform networking. Recent advances
in microprocessor design made this idea a worthwhile
proposition. In order to ensure compatibility the service
focused on a large scale acquisition of one thousand
microcomputers by the same manufacturer. The desire was to
purchase devices with a sizable internal capacity and
extensive communications ability. For obvious reasons, this
effort became known as the Standard Terminal project.
During June of 1981 a vendor known as Convergent
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Figure 12. The Secure Command and Control Network
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Technologies or C3, Inc., was chosen to provide the Standard
Terminal [Ref. 14: pp. 3-19].
The Standard Terminal is a sixteen bit microcomputer
with one megabyte of internal storage. It supports numerous
high order languages (i.e., Pascal, Fortran, Cobol) as well
as word processing, graphics and specialized applications
programs. One of the strongest features of the Standard
Terminal is in the area of communications. Up to sixteen
terminals may be clustered to form a local area network bus
structure. The unit also supports all three levels of X.25
protocol (physical, data link, and network layers of the ISO
model) for long-haul networking. In addition, the Standard
Terminal may be made to emulate nearly any asynchronous
terminal device. These features have proven invaluable to
the Coast Guard. This microprocessor is the basic component
of the PMIS and the principle terminal device for
communicating with OCC, MSIS and other mainframes. The unit
may also serve as a teletype replacement under ODIN. The
Standard Terminal has also been used to access a Defense
Data Network TAC at the Naval Postgraduate School.
The use of the Standard Terminal is local area
networking varies from place to place. Some districts have
the ability to download applications from a minicomputer to
Standard Terminal networks. Other commands are using
clustered terminals without connecting to a larger
mainframe. Still others invoke the Standard Terminal in a
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stand alone mode or simply use it as a "dumb" terminal to
connect to the systems described in this Section via
Telenet.
G. THE NEED FOR AN INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE
Each of the computer processes outlined evolved from
separate communities of interests to meet unique needs.
Consequently, the networks that supported these applications
also arose independently. The Coast Guard can no longer
afford to pursue computer host telecommunications in this
manner. The service has begun to realize that the various
networks are simply resources that move and process data,
regardless of whether the information itself is supply,
personnel, operational or military message traffic in nature
[Ref. 14: p. 1-1], Therefore, the need is to develop a
comprehensive information architecture to allow different
parts of the Coast Guard to implement applications at
different paces. The issue then becomes an overall network
management task to ensure transactions are handled with the
appropriate connectivity security and priority. Figure 1
3
outlines this planned information architecture approach
[Ref. 1 4: p. 1-2].
Historically there has been a district split between
traditional record communications and data communications
The user of the Coast Guard's Communications System was the


















changed this philosophy. The user is actually the person or
program processing an application. The network manager then
becomes a facilitator or change agent for users [Ref. 14: p.
1-1]. The Defense Data Network has also adopted this
apprcach. Although DDN will replace the entire Autodin
system, it is estimated that over seventy percent of the
communications on the network will contain computer data,
not record message traffic [Ref. 7: p. 67],
One of the major unanswered questions is exactly what
role DDN will play in the Coast Guard's Resources Management
Architecture scheme. Figure 13 shows DDN as a link between
Coast Guard Headquarters, District and other agencies, but
the functional requirements for this connection have yet to
be determined. This illustration also points out that the
service's efforts have been in the areas of public networks
(Telenet) and polled networks (ODIN). Under the arrangement
illustrated, each District would be required to maintain the
hardware and software for four separate long-haul networks.
This implies tremendous compatibility and relaying problems
as well as the need for a variety of resources. It would
certainly be advantageous to lessen this difficulty by
placing more systems on fewer networks. The logical choice
would be to expand DDN access and thereby eliminate the need
for other means of computer telecommunications because:
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1. The Coast Guard will require DDN access to be
compatible with DOD.
2. DDN is designed to provide effective computer host
telecommunications that is based on the success of
ARPANET
.
3. Commercial carrier services are expensive and may not
meet the security needs of the Coast Guard.
4. Intra Coast Guard and DOD record communications
networks should be automatically interfaced.
5. It is quite likely that the U.S. Navy will provide
much of the DDN hardware in an arrangement similar to
Navy/Coast Guard Autodin agreement.
The advantages to this perspective do not come without
paying a price. The Coast Guard would be forced to abandon
many installed and planned networks and accept the packet
switched, datagram -based model described in Section II. It
would also be impractical to give every Coast Guard unit
direct access to DDN. Some form of in tra -service
communications must be maintained. It is important to note
that the Coast Guard is not a major DDN subscriber. The
other services will require the vast majority of resources.
On the other hand, it is foolish to merely replace every
Autodin terminal with DDN hardware. The need to merge data
and record communications is known by all parties.
The next sections will attempt to consolidate the
physical and logical aspects of DDN with the needs of the
U.S. Coast Guard. The focus will be upon determining DDN
access and developing the functional requirements necessary
to grant that access. The boundaries between intra-service
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networks and the Defense Data Network could be anywhere
along the Coast Guard's organizational hierarchy. Figure 13
suggests that District offices and computer resource units
are prime candidates for consideration of the placement of
the boundary. This means that the majority of the
discussion will center upon linking local area networks and
larger Coast Guard communities of interest to DDN.
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IV. RECOMMENDED DDN ACCESS PLAN
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this section is to determine the level of
Defense Data Network access by the U. S. Coast Guard. The
recommendations presented herein are based upon two
criteria. First, DDN access should only be granted to
computer hosts that meet the Defense Data Network's design
objectives. There is little value in going through the
expense of adopting the packet switching techniques of
Section II when no real need for host telecommunications is
present. The second consideration is that Coast Guard DDN
access must be consistant with the information resources
management architecture presented in Section III. The
Defense Data Network must be an integrated part of the Coast
Guard's total networking scheme. It is of paramount
importance that existing systems become adaptively
compatible with DDN to avoid the cost and effort of
maintaining multiple, specialized network structures.
The process of examining each Coast Guard command
individually to decide if the above criteria are met would
be a laborious task that may not produce the desired
results. A better approach is to view the access question
from the intracommand, intercommand and interservice
perspective. Many commands can utilize the Coast Guard's
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computer systems in exactly the same manner with geographic
location being the only difference.
B. INTRACOMMAND ACCESS
Intracommand access implies the use of DDN for data
communications between locations within a single unit.
This is in violation of the first criteria. The Defense
Data Network is a means of long-haul telecommunications and
it would be inappropriate to utilize DDN for intracommand
access. An important point here is that DDN is not an
office automation technique. Each command connected to the
network will be responsible for developing its own internal
architecture (this may take the form of multiple processors
in a local area network or simply a series of terminals
connected to a single host). The purpose of the internal
network is two fold. It must contain some form of routing
or dissemination process to ensure that the correct user
terminal is addressed. In addition, a data base or
consolidated process is required so that interfacing to long
haul networks can be accomplished at a single point. This
is a familiar pattern that will be repeated throughout all
levels of access.
Fortunately, the Coast Guard can rely upon the Standard
Terminal for intracommand data communications. The
microprocessor's clustering ability is ideally suited to
meet nearly every unit's internal architectural needs. The
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fact that Standard Terminals can also be tied to larger
mainframes offers several networking advantages that will be
explored in the next section.
C. INTERCOMMAND ACCESS
The subject of intercommand access brings into focus the
critical issue of determining the boundary between DDN and
other networks within the Coast Guard. For example, should
commands separated by a kilometer or so use the Defense Data
Network to exchange data communications? The answer is most
probably no. Recent technological advances have made it
feasible to greatly extend the geographic range of local
area networks to meet this type of application. The effect
has been to greatly reduce the need to implement more
expensive long-haul networking techniques of greater
complexity [Ref. 16: pp. 1497-1498]. However, consider the
same question if the units are further apart. Then there
are two available options; either DDN could be employed or
the Coast Guard could rely upon their own long haul
networks. Geographic location can also be used to resolve
this question.
The Coast Guard approach to networking arose
independently from DDN development. Some of the service's
efforts, such as ODIN have already been described. One
methodology that has not yet been mentioned was to create
what is termed regional networks within each District.
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Figure 14 shows the district boundaries as well as the
location of each District Commander. A regional network can
employ a polling scheme compatible with ODIN over Coast
Guard leased telecommunication lines. Another alternative
is to use the Standard Terminal's X.25 capabilities.
Traditionally, regional networks were devoted to teletype
applications for record communications but the concept has
been expanded to include data communications as well (much
of the data communications aspects are still under
development). An excellent way to view regional networks is
to consider them as non DDN long-haul schemes within a
District. The main advantage to this approach is that
network boundaries are determined on the basis of
operational requirements. A large portion of the service's
data communications needs can be handled within s single
District, thereby greatly lessening inter-District network
congestion. Each District Commander is responsible for
developing and maintaining his regional network. Perhaps
the most important decision to be made is where to combine
two or more commands into a local area network with single
regional network access. This depends upon how closely the
commands are located and the potential for sharing a common
data base. Therefore, the exact configuration of each
regional network varies between Districts.
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Figure 14. Coast Guard Districts
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The focal point for long-haul data communications becomes
the headquarters of the District Commander (District
Office). District offices now become prime candidates for
DDN access. Data exchanges between a District Office host
and the Defense Data Network could be handled through a
DDN/LAN connection. Other units within a District could
access DDN via a regional network. An argument may be made
for abolishing the regional networks and directly connecting
all LANs to the Defense Data Network. This would indeed
eliminate much of the burden on the District offices but the
gain is outweighed by the following factors:
1. Each District Office has a computer host mainframe.
Smaller units within a District tend to be
microprocessor based. As a general rule, it would not
be effective to pursue the cost and effort of
implementing DDN hardware and software at smaller
units.
2. The District offices are the major users of Coast
Guard wide computer systems (OPINS, PMIS, etc.).
3. The Coast Guard has experience with regional networks.
4. Regional networks have proven effective for handling
record communications and should also perform well for
data communications.
5. The communications capability of the Standard Terminal
ease local area and regional network development.
There are cases, however, where it is beneficial to
provide additional DDN access within a District. This
occurs when a District includes a computer resource unit.
These commands with large mainframes and data bases serve
the entire Coast Guard and should also be connected to the
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Defense Data Network. Another logical choice for
intercommand DDN access is units which are a part of the
Autodin system. This includes Coast Guard Communications
Stations and Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Table V shows a complete listing of commands within the
service that are recommended to become a part of the Defense
Data Network.
This access plan would ensure that all of the computer
systems outlined in Section III would effectively be able
to utilize DDN. There are several aspects to this plan
which should be considered in further detail. First there
is a definite possibility that multiple hosts at the same
location could share DDN resources. This is especially true
in places like Governors Island, New York, where two hosts
serving different applications are in the same building.
The plan also calls for a complete merger of data and record
communications.. For example, each District Office will be
required to tie in their computer mainframes with DDN
hardware and software to form a comprehensive information
processing scheme. This is, of course, the overall intent
of both DDN and Coast Guard networking architectures. The
success of the effort is crucial to intercommand access
issue. It means that an effective hierarchical networking
structure could be established between Coast Guard local
area, regional and long-haul networks and DDN. This implies
not only the elimination of the need for commercial carriers
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Table V. Coast Guard Commands that are Recommended for
Access to the Defense Data Network
DISTRICT OFFICES
CCGDONE Boston, MA.




CCGDSEVEN Miami , FL
.
CCGD EIGHT New Orleans, LA,
CCGDNINE Cleveland, OH.









Military Pay Center Topeka,
KA.
MSIS Mainframe (location to be
determined)
Autodin Replacement Cites and








AIRSTA Elizabeth City, N.C.
Group Baltimore, MD.
CGHQ Washington, D.C.
such as TELENET but "also total connectivity. Any user can
invoke whatever data processing application required using
this approach.
D. INTERSERVICE ACCESS
The bulk of Coast Guard interservice DDN access will be
in the form of traditional record communications message
traffic. This is because the Coast Guard is under the
Department of Transportation during peacetime and operates
under a different set of procedures from the U.S. Navy and
the rest of DOD. Therefore, there is little opportunity to
utilize most Naval computer applications packages. The two
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services do, however, carry out joint operational missions
and the need for communications compatibility is ever
present. The same rationale that allowed the Coast Guard to
become part of the Autodin system also applies to DDN.
Since the recommended DDN access plan includes all present
Autodin sites, interservice communications should not be
adversely affected. The possibility also exists that in
special cases, the Coast Guard could utilize Naval data
processing resources via DDN. A wartime scenario would call
for the full integration of the Coast Guard into the Navy
and the Defense Data Network would prove an invaluable tool
for this purpose.
E. PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
Table VI presents a summary of DDN projected
performance (single-homed subscribers are connected to one
node, dual-homed subscribers are connected to two nodes).
[Ref. 17: p. 6], These results are much better than those
of Coast Guard long-haul networks especially with regard to
delay times and error control. The most important
performance characteristics desired by the Coast Guard are
in the areas of technical expertise and maintainability. In
order to interface Coast Guard mainframes to DDN, the
service will require assistance with the more technical
aspects of networking. Another consideration is that
Coastguardsmen will need training in facilities maintenance
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and DDN packet switching concepts to minimize downtime.
Clearly, once a DDN access plan is finalized the Coast Guard
and the U.S. Navy will be required to develop an
interservice agreement on these issues as well as provisions
for hardware and software. The Coast Guard must be able to
establish their networking requirements as well as
understand the potential of DDN to be integrated into the
services data communications architecture. This is one of
the primary objectives of this thesis.
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A. THE NEED FOR FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The discussion to this point has centered around system
applications and network architectures for determining the
best use of the Defense Data Network by the U.S. Coast
Guard. In simpler terms, emphasis has been placed on
answering the who, what, and why questions of this issue.
Now the time has come to explore how DDN can be connected to
local area and regional networks. The focus shifts from
computer networks and their components (architecture) to the
exact hardware and software specifications (implementation)
required to achieve networking goals [Ref 18: p. 215]. The
preferred method of accomplishing this is through the use of
functional modules. A functional module description
contains the precise purpose of a particular hardware device
or program. The advantage to a functional approach is that
many applications can utilize a common set of functional
modules to avoid redundancy. It no longer becomes necessary
to define a separate data communications scheme for each
system application for example. Thus precious networking
resources are used in the most effective manner [Ref: 19, p.
2], This does not imply that architectural or applications
matters are unimportant in functional design. These form
the basis for a networking effort. The functional approach
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is a mechanism for achieving desired results and therefore
must always be consistant with application and architectural
goals
.
The end result of a functional design is one or more
implementation block diagrams. This allows for the tracing
of a data communications path from source to destination
through each applicable functional module. Several familiar
patterns will emerge when describing this flow. First it is
necessary to point out the input requirements to each
module. Then, the process within a module will be discussed
and finally the outputs are determined. Functional modules
are in effect individual building blocks. Each relies
heavily on others for specific purposes. One of the main
problems in computer networking is that designers must be
able to understand both macro and micro perspectives. Great
care must be taken to ensure that overall system concepts
and individual key elements are distinguished. Otherwise
the true purpose of functional modules becomes lost in a
maze of complex technicalities.
The functional requirements of Coast Guard/DDN
interconnection will be discussed in terms of hardware,
software and security. Once again it should be pointed out
that these are artificial distinctions for the purpose of
simplification. In fact it is impossible to separate the
three aspects and still have an effective network. The
physical and logical viewpoints of Section II will serve as
65

starting point for this more advanced networking
explanation.
B . HARDWARE
The functional requirements for hardware are relatively
simple to understand. There are only three reasons for
invoking computer hardware. They are:
1 . To process a user application.
2. To gain access to a network.
3. To move data through a network.
The first category of hardware consists primarily of Coast
Guard mainframes and microprocessors. Examples include the
Operations Computer Center, Standard Terminals and District
Office minicomputers. Section III adequately described
these resources as well as the primary Coast Guard user
applications. The third category is principally the Defense
Data Networks backbone structure. This is merely the
collection of IMPs that move packets through the subnetwork
in the manner explained in Section II. The most important
developmental hardware type to make the proposed Coast
Guard/DDN architecture a reality becomes devices that grant
DDN access. These processors make the continuous data flow
through the hierarchical networking structure possible.
Figure 15 shows the various ways that the Defense Data
Network may be accessed. [Ref. 17: p. 8] Host mainframes
can be directly tied to DDN. This will require that all DDN
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Figure 15. DDN Access Hardware
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protocols reside within the subscriber host. The direct
host implementation can employ full DDN networking services
such as establishing host-to-host terminal-to-host and host-
to-terminal connections [Ref . 7: p. 163]. The main
disadvantage to this approach is that valuable computer
capacity, designed for user applications, is taken up with
DDN networking protocols.
Another alternative is to provide host access through
the use of a front-end-processor. This device is itself a
computer designed specifically for handling host to network
data communications thereby eliminating the burden on user
applications mainframes. The DDN-developed Host Front-End
Processor (HFEP) connects on one side to the subscriber's
mainframe bus or I/O channel. The HFEP contains all of the
required protocols to allow for full DDN networking services
and connections to the backbone. [Ref. 7: p. 164]. In
addition, users may develop their own front-end processors
for access to DDN or other networks.
There is one other method that a user host may be tied
into the Defense Data Network. A device called a Terminal
Emulation Processor can link a mainframe's terminal ports to
a backbone IMP. Even though the TEP has DDN protocols, the
host mainframe appears logically to be only a set of
connected terminals. Full networking services are
unavailable and therefore this access approach is not
recommended [Ref. 7: p. 164].
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Individual terminals can be linked to the Defense Data
Network in two ways. The most obvious method is via a
subscriber host. Another alternative is to utilize a
Terminal Access Controller as described in Section II.
Connection to a TAC may be established via serial attachment
for colocated equipment, a communications circuit, or by
telephone dial in. Initially, the Defense Communications
Agency was opposed to dial in access because of security
reasons. However, dial in access has since been allowed
with the stipulation that tight controls be instituted to
prevent unauthorized entry into the network. [Ref. 7: p.
19].
The DDN access picture is completed with the addition of
network monitoring centers. DDN developed monitoring
centers were outlined in Section II. It is also possible
for a subscriber community to establish their own monitoring
capability.
The most critical hardware issue is determining which
access method best suits Coast Guard needs. One important
fact to remember is that Figure 15 represents access to only
one network, DDN. The primary concern of the Coast Guard as
subscribers is to also connect the service's regional and
some local area networks to form the entire network
architecture. The best choice is to utilize front-end
processors for host access. This is because the Coast Guard
has made no allowance for implementing DDN protocols in
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their mainframes and the TEP does not have full network
service capabilities. However, the major design issue is
not the access of one host but rather the interconnection of
other networks.
The access plan of Section V has taken into account the
need to translate from single host to local area and
regional networks. The consolidation of DDN data
communications at District Office mainframes serves this
purpose. It appears from the Defense Data Network
perspective that one host (the District Office mainframe)
has access through a front-end processor. In reality this
host serves as the focal point for data communications for
not only the District Commander, but also those connected to
the regional network. This implies that each District
Office mainframe would be required to have substantial
telecommunications capabilities. The most beneficial
situation would be to have a single front-end processor for
all networking needs at each District. Unfortunately, this
is difficult for practical reasons. The HFEP has been
designated for use for DDN access only and not other
networks. This leaves the Coast Guard with two options, 1
)
develop a subscriber front-end that can access all Coast
Guard networks and DDN. 2) Utilize the HFEP for DDN access
and other means for local area and regional networks. The
second alternative is probably the most preferred since it
saves a great deal of research and development in DDN
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protocol implementation. For the most part, Coast Guard
networks use communications software that is installed in
the same processors that handle user applications.
Therefore, most District Offices do not require separate
front-end processors for local area and regional networks.
This option is available however if additional mainframe
capacity is desired.
Figure 16 shows a simplified hardware block diagram
assuming that the HFEP is the only required front-end
processor. A Standard Terminal local area network within a
District accesses the District Office host via a regional
network. In turn, the District Office host is connected to
an intracommand regional network, a HFEP and the Coast
Guard's long haul ODIN network.
These same principles can be applied to computer
resource units and other commands that require DDN access
and are not a District Office. The Coast Guard could also
take advantage of Terminal Access Controllers. A Standard
Terminal can be connected to a TAC it is using the
asynchronous terminal emulator feature. DDN can then be
used to grant access to other hosts (and through Coast Guard
hosts, regional and local area networks). The dial-in
feature of the TAC and the simplicity of the connection make
this alternative attractive in cases where a user











Figure 16. A Typical Example of a Coast Guard Multiple
Network Connection.
C . SOFTWARE
1 . The Importance of Protocols
The fact that the Coast Guard and DDN hardware
require interconnection to form a network architecture is
readily apparent. However, no hardware explanation alone
could possibly describe the functional implementation
process. The key to the successful integration of Coast
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Guard local area and long-haul networks with DDN primarily
rests with the ability to determine required protocols.
Section II provided the basic description of a protocol.
Recall that protocols serve to grant access, handle packets
through the backbone, and establish a means of end-to-end
control by means of a layering process.
The common protocol between Coast Guard and DDN
networks is X.25. It may appear that the best way to handle
packets in the physical data link and network layers would
be to invoke X.25 at all locations where Coast Guard and DDN
access is desired. Unfortunately, this methodology will not
produce the desired interconnection in the near future. The
Defense Communications Agency has emphasized that the only
supported DDN access means is via a Protocol called 1822
along with TCP and IP. [Ref 15: p. 3]. There are two major
problems with a X.25 implementation for DDN. The first is
that there are a large variety of incompatible X.25 packages
available which could cause serious operational problems for
DDN users [Ref 15: p. 3]. Secondly, the X.25 virtual
circuit approach is in direct conflict with the DDN
philosophy of utilizing datagrams for communications within
the backbone or network layer. It will most probably take a
substantial period of time to resolve these difficulties.
Therefore, it is recommended that the Coast Guard adopt the
existing 1822/IP/TCP implementation for DDN networking. It
is entirely possible that the Coast Guard may desire to
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change to a X.25 implementation when a good X.25 DDN
standard is agreed upon. However, it should be noted that
this would eliminate the need for the 1822 protocol only.
TCP and IP would still be required for DDN communications.
Below is a listing of all of the needed protocols for the
Defense Data Network along with a brief description of their
purpose [Ref. 17: p. 13]:
Transmission Control Protocol/ Internet Protocol
(TCP/IP) --permit s end-to-end flow of data between two
computer systems or between a host and a TAC.
File Transfer Protocol (FTP) —a protocol that allows
for the transfer of files between hosts.
Telnet--A virtual terminal protocol that converts
different terminal types to common virtual terminal format
for use throughout the network. (This is not to be confused
with TELENET the commercial dial in service).
Volumes of information is available on these
protocols. The descriptions provided herein are merely
brief summaries of the functional aspects of DDN software.
An attempt will be made to define these protocols in terms
of the layer of operation, specification of services, and
the interaction of a particular protocol with protocols of
other layers [Ref. 20: p. 625]. The reader is referred to
the Defense Data Network Program Plan for a more detailed
explanation of DDN protocols. An excellent discussion of IP
and TCP can also be found in the October, 1980 issue of the
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ACM Computer Communications Review .
2. The 1822 Protocol
The 1822 Protocol roughly corresponds to the
physical and data link layers of the ISO model. Its primary
use is for establishing the host to IMP or TAC to IMP access
connection for the Defense Data Network. The protocol was
initially developed by the Bolt Beranek and Newman
Corporation for the ARPANET and found acceptable for use
with DDN. [Ref. 7: p. 154] One of the main services
provided by the protocol (besides host-to-IMP connection) is
that it allows for location independent addressing. This
means that connections may be referred to physically and
logically thereby permitting multiple users without
additional hardware interfacing. The 1822 local host option
has a distance limitation of 2000 feet. This distance can
be increased through the use of modems and the 1822 Distant
Host or Very Distant Host option [Ref. 7: pp. 154-155]. The
protocol will normally reside within the HFEP in cases where
front-end devices are used for DDN access. When the X.25
protocol is available for DDN use, access can also be gained
through High-Level Data Link Control (HDLC). HDLC is a
protocol found within X.25 at the data link layer.
3. The Internet Protocol
Once access to the DDN backbone is obtained, the
internet protocol (along with IMP to IMP protocol) is
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responsible for packet switching through the subnetwork.
There are two basic requirements for this service: the
physical address of source and destination. The purpose of
IP is to move datagrams independently through the backbone.
This means that each packet must contain an internet header.
In keeping with the true nature of datagrams, there are no
provisions for data reliability, flow control or sequencing.
Therefore, end-to-end acknowledgement is impossible with IP
and reliable communications are not guaranteed [Ref. 18: pp.
15-16]. Packets are routed through the subnetwork via the
routing algorithm described in Section II. Since the
control of packets is not maintained with IP, packets are
given a finite lifetime in the network to avoid congestion
problems.
The internet protocol derives its name form the fact
that it also serves outside of the DDN backbone for
interconnecting networks. There are three basic parameters
required to perform this function; 1) The name of the
resource being sought (what), 2) The address of the resource
(where), 3) The route to be taken (how), [Ref. 22: p. 614].
The last two items are handled via the internet protocol and
IMP-to-IMP communications schemes. The name of a resource
is actually a symbol or logical address of a particular
process, device, or service [Ref. 22: p. 614]. This
parameter comes from the higher level TCP protocol. One
problem that can occur is that packet sizes between networks
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may differ. In this case it is necessary to split packets
and later reassemble them for transmission through other
networks. Therefore, IP has provisions for packet
fragmentation for this purpose [Ref. 21: p. 20]. In
summary, the internet protocol allows multiple networks to
share a convention for packet addressing, routing and
fragmentation. This concept in computer networking is
called a gateway [Ref. 4: pp. 638-639].
Appendix B contains a description of the IP header.
A diagram of the header format and a description of header
fields is provided. (Some fields were not described in the
text but their explanations in pointed out in the appendix.
[Ref. 21 : pp. 22-25] .
4. The Transmission Control Protocol
The Transmission Control Protocol is designed to
provide reliable host-to-host communications between packet
switched networks, particularly DDN. [Ref. 23: p. 54] In
other words, TCP must be able to overcome the inadequacies
of the internet protocol with regard to end-to-end control.
TCP and IP are in fact extremely dependent on each other in
the protocol layering implementation process [Ref. 24: p.
55]. The transmission control protocol is on of the most
versatile (and therefore one of the most complex) protocols
in the field of computer networking. Here is a listing of
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TCP services along with a brief description of the protocols
implementation approach:
a) Basic Data Trans fer--TCP allows users to send or
receive a continuous stream of data and prepares
packets for transmission via the internet protocol
[Ref. 24: p. 57].
b) Reliability—TCP provides for end-to-end acknowledge-
ment of packets and the retransmission of unreceived
packets [Ref. 23: p. 57]. This means that the
protocol establishes packet sequencing for error
detection and the correct reassembling of packets
[Ref. 4: p. 643].
c) Flow Control— TCP allows the receiver to govern the
amount of data transmitted through the use of windows
[Ref. 4: p. 643]. This concept was described in
Section II.
d) Multiplexing— a single host is allowed multiple
processors through the use of TCP. This means that
the protocol establishes the logical naming of
different processors. [Ref. 23: p. 58],
e) Connections—TCP provides for a logical host-to-host
connection. The user has the ability to monitor the
status of host connections. [Ref. 23: p. 58],
f ) Precedence and Securi ty--The user may indicate the
precedence and security of computer communications.
Details of the TCP header are contained in Appendix
C. The transmission control protocol plays a key role. It
is the users interface with the network allowing control of
the host-to-host communications process. At the same time
it interacts with the internet protocol to ensure reliable
end-to-end transfer of data. Item e, is a particularly
interesting feature. In order to communicate between hosts
the user must establish a logical connection through TCP.
Actual commands such as OPEN, CLOSE and STATUS deal
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specifically with this logical connection [Ref. 23: pp. 62-
63]. Notice that the overall effect has been to transform
the backbone datagram process into a host-to-host virtual
circuit process [Ref. 8: pp. 32-33]. These are some of the
most revolutionary concepts in computer networking. The
speed of independent travelling datagrams is combined with
the reliability of virtual circuit service in one network!
This result is the reason for the warning of maintaining
perspective in computer networking. The function of
protocols must be tied to the layers in which they serve.
Also the distinction between physical and logical connection
and addressing is of paramount importance. Hopefully this
difference will be more clearly pointed out in Section V-C-
6.
5. The File Transfer and Telnet Protocols
These two protocols deal primarily with specific
user applications and are therefore lumped together in this
subsection even though they perform separate functions.
Both FTP and Telnet rely upon the networking capabilities
established by the 1822/TCP/IP protocols.
The file transfer protocol accomplishes exactly what
the name implies. It allows a user to transfer files from
one host to another. This basically means that a set of
conventions have been agreed upon for file structure.
Examples include controls for start of file, end of text,
end of file, etc. Users will be required to possess file
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formats that make use of this protocol [Ref. 17: p. 13].
Normally this is not a problem. FTP has demonstrated its
flexibility to accommodate a variety of file structures.
Telnet allows a user to appear that his terminal is
directly connected to a foreign host. The protocol creates
a common set of terminal characteristics known as a network
virtual terminal (NVT) [Ref. 7: p. 158], This becomes a
standard format for all terminals in the entire network and
embraces the TCP/IP inter-networking capabilities [Ref. 17:
p. 133.
6. The Internetworking of Coast Guard/DDN Software
The protocols discussed up to this point will allow
a host to utilize the full services of DDN. However, the
access plan of Section III requires the addition of Coast
Guard local area and regional networks. The DDN method of
interconnecting networks (gateways) has already been
described. The problem of continuing this approach into
Coase Guard networks is that DDN software would be required
at each user processing point. A more economical procedure
would be to connect multiple local area networks to a single
host for long-haul networking [Ref. 16: p. 1498]. This is
precisely the idea behind Coast Guard regional networks. In
effect each District Office host also serves as a gateway.
This is not a TCP/IP Defense Data Network gateway but rather
a local area /regional to DDN transfer. The difference is
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that 1822/TCP/IP need not be contained in processors below
the District Command level.
This alternative seems quite attractive but
unfortunately the functional requirements for such an
arrangement are often difficult to determine and theoretical
in nature. In the past, local area technology has lagged
behind long-haul network development but this gap is
constantly being shortened [Ref. 16: pp. 1497-1498].
The U.S. Coast Guard has one major advantage over
most other subscribers who may attempt connecting multiple
local area networks to DDN at one gateway. Standard
Terminal configurations can bridge long-haul and local area
networks. Internal software to the device makes it possible
to cluster microprocessors to form local area networks as
well as provide remote data communications via an X.25
polling scheme. The key developmental area is the
establishment of the District Office multiple gateway. The
Standard Terminal regional network must be tied to the
minicomputer mainframe. For the sake of clarity, it will be
assumed that each District host will have two front-end
processors. One will handle DDN communications (HFEP) and
the other will serve the regional network. This second
device will be designated as a Coast Guard front-end
processor (CGFEP). The distinction is made for illustrative
purposes. In actuality, the case may be that all
81

communications software resides in a single front-end or
some/all protocols are internal to Coast Guard mainframes.
Figure 17 shows the software block diagram for the
regional network connection (notice that the addition of the
CGFEP also calls for a hardware modification). The regional
network is established via X.25 and polling protocols
(ODIN). Terminals at the District Office LAN may be linked
to the regional network and/or directly to a mainframe port.
This allows terminals at the District to be a part of the
regional network and also process user applications directly
from the co- located host. The CGFEP can control the ODIN
polling process or establish virtual circuits between the
host and local area networks. In either case its primary
responsibility rests with physical and logical addressing
and data routing. It may not be necessary to include both
X.25 and ODIN in all instances. However, one possibility is
that polling could be used for interservice long-haul
network traffic while X.25 is designated exclusively for
regional communications. This would allow local area
networks to form virtual circuits independent of the host.
Figure 17 represents only two local area networks (the
District LAN plus one other). In reality, the District
regional network will be comprised of more LANS. The figure
was kept simple for ease of understanding.
The last stage of the interconnection problem is to
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Figure 17. A Coast Guard Regional Network
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the overall network architecture. One of the pioneers in
developing the functional requirements for the interfacing
of local area networks to DDN is Professor Norman
Schneidewind of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Many of
the concepts described below can be found in his report
entitled, Functional Design of a Local Area Network for the
Stock Point Integrated Communications Environment , December,
1982. [Ref. 25 ]
The crux of the problem rests with converting the
regional network message formats to suitable DDN packets.
This is accomplished with the insertion of a National
Communications functional module (NC) [Ref. 25: p. 27].
This module performs two major services. The first to be
described is protocol convention. The LAN message is
transformed into one compatible with DDN. This requires
that the physical and logical addresses of the process are
transferred from the local area message to the headers in
TCP and IP. Figure 18 illustrates this important idea [Ref.
25: p. 37]. The TCP header receives the logical address for
virtual circuit services. The IP header obtains the
physical address of source and destination. This allows for
the NC to perform its section function of the creation of
datagram packets [Ref. 25: p. 28]. Figure 19 shows the
entire internet datagram [Ref. 25: p. 36], This simple
figure points out a profound networking concept. The
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Destination Port: Destination Logical Address(
Figure 18. Internet Datagram Showing Fields of IP Header,























Complete message or fragment
Figure 19. An Internet Datagram
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embedded in the internet packet [Ref. 4: p. 639], The
appropriate address is summoned when the pertinent protocol
is activated. This is known as header wrapping [Ref. 25: p.
33]. Thus it is possible to trace data communications
through both Coast Guard networks and DDN by studying the
protocol header address at a given time. The Coast Guard
multiple gateway will be required to handle all of the
physical and logical addresses for source and destination
for the entire internetworking scheme. The identity of the
correct host, local area network, and process in a virtual
sense must be maintained along with its physical location.
Figure 20 shows the Coast Guard/DDN functional
requirement block diagram for hardware and software [Ref.
25: p. 35]. By adding the NC to the Coast Guard front-end
processor, the interconnection between the regional network
and DDN is established. This example assumes data
communications between a Coast Guard host/local area
networks and DDN is desired. It is also possible to form a
communications path between regional networks by creating a
mirror image of a regional network on each side of the HFEP
devices. Each portion of this figure has been discussed
within this section so there is no need to repeat an
explanation of these functional requirements. There are,
however, several aspects to the network structure that are
not shown in Figure 20. One is that regional communications
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Figure 20. The Coast Guard/DDN Internetworking Connection
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Defense Data Network. Therefore, it will be necessary to
buffer data to prevent overflows [Ref. 25: p. 28]. The
buffers will exist between the Coast Guard host, regional
network and the HFEP. Figure 20 also does not how protocols
that are above the transport layer. It is assumed that for
Coast Guard inter-command applications, the Standard
Terminal will have the required additional software. In
cases where Coast Guard /DOD communications are applicable,
TELNET, FTP or some other agreed upon set of higher level
protocols will be needed. Finally recall that there are DDN
access provisions other than through front-end processors.
In particular, the Coast Guard may desire to take advantage
of the Standard Terminal to TAC DDN connection in some
instances.
D. SECURITY AND IMPLEMENTATION TIMETABLE
Section II introduced the IPLI device and the separation
of user communities cryptographically for security purposes.
Figure 21 shows all of the safeguards of DDN to support
security and privacy [Ref. 17: p. 10], These measures
include [Ref. 17: p. 11];
1. Link encryption on all backbone links and classified
host and TAC access links.
2. End to end encryption by IPLI devices.
3. A cryptographic authentication code will be used by
Monitoring Centers to prevent unauthorized




• Cryptographic Separation of User Communities
• Protection from Unauthorized Denial of Service
• Protection from Unauthorized Analysis of Traffic Flow




' TT v P s Tp7 .jTI '
1 N N N h e U R E
N C O C y c T O
!
M
K R T R s u H T PV O V 1 R E O EP ° P C 1 N C S
T E T A T T O T















4. Physical security measures will be taken to protect
classified data.
5. Network elements will be TEMPEST-approved.
Most probably the Coast Guard should become a
partitioned user community from the rest of the subscribers
of DDN. One potential networking problem is that the Coast
Guard's planned secure C3 system will be incompatible with
DDN. The designers of the C3 system should be cautioned
against this possibility if the service desires Coast
Guard/DDN secure data communications. This thesis does not
deal with secure inter-networking because the Coast Guard
has not yet finalized a scheme for the C3 system.
The IPLI units will not become fully available until
approximately the middle of 1985. In the meantime, military
unclassified users of the ARPANET will branch out to form a
DDN segment called MILNET. This phase of implementations has
already begun and includes over half of the previous ARPANET
subscribers. The ARPANET will continue to exist as a
research and development tool. Once all of the IPLI devices
become available the entire Defense Data Network will be
completed [Ref. 17: pp. 21-22]. The Coast Guard, U.S. Navy
and the Defense Communications Agency have yet to formalize
a DDN implementation schedule for the Coast Guard.
Hopefully, their agreement will be completed during the late
1983 early 1984 timeframe and will contain many of the




Computer networks have reached the stage of development
where it is not longer necessary to tailor data
communications to a specific user application. Both the
Department of Defense and the U.S. Coast Guard have
recognized that it is now possible to share computer
resources in an economical fashion to meet all information
processing needs. This is particularly evident in the
desire to communicate traditional military message traffic
and other computer data by using the same network
architecture. The DOD approach to overcoming hardware and
software incompatibility problems is to implement the packet
switched Defense Data Network. On the other hand, the coast
Guard has chosen to institute network hierarchies and
install processors that can be implemented under a variety
of data communications schemes. Each method has its
advantages and set-backs. The Defense Data Network can
interconnect multiple long-haul networks but requires
additional development to form the local area/DDN interface.
The Coast Guard has bridged the local area/long-haul network
gap by the use of Standard Terminals but compatibility




This thesis has described both approaches and
recommended an integrated Coast Guard/DDN network
architecture. Since most Coastguardsmen are unfamiliar with
DDN, an attempt was made to fully develop the implications
of packet switching and Defense Data Network methodology.
The implementation of the recommended architecture was based
upon hardware and protocol functional requirements. The
success of this effort will depend on the Coast Guard's
ability to develop a front-end processor that can fulfill
the data communications requirements of local area networks,
host mainframes and DDN. The critical element is to create
a mechanism to transfer physical and logical addresses as
data travels through the network hierarchy. The Coast Guard
has begun this development with networks internal to the
service. It is most strongly recommended that the scope of
the effort be extended to include a means of interacting
with the national communications module to provide full DDN
services.
It may appear to some that it is not worth the trouble
and expense to interconnect computer networks. The truth of
the matter is that the Armed Forces, or any other user of
multiple computers, can ill afford to operate and maintain
incompatible systems. Communications problems have plagued
man since the Tower of Babel. Each successful attempt to





DEFENSE DATA NETWORK HARDWARE COST
COSTING MODEL
In general, costs have the following components: a
direct hardware capital cost, a monthly maintenance cost,
and installation cost and a one-time integration cost. The
monthly maintenance cost is computed as 1.75% of the direct
hardware cost. The installation cost is a one-time cost
which is computed as 5.25% of the direct hardware cost. The
integration cost is charged only for non-BBN products. This
is computed as 15% of the direct hardware cost. These rates
apply to all hardware items in the design with the exception
of KG-84 encryption devices.
MULTIPLEXERS (TEMPEST, HEMP)
The cost of connecting a terminal to a TAC is the cost
of the multiplexer (if used), the cost of the line, the cost
of KG's (if needed) and the cost of the TAC port. In the
cost model, multiplexers are priced on a per channel basis,
where there is one channel for each terminal whose data is
multiplexed. The per channel costs have been computed
assuming that there is a multiplexer at both ends of the
line and that the multiplexers meet both Tempest and HEMP
requirements. The costs per channel for a multiplexer are:
hardware cost: $2124.00
maintenance cost: $ 37.17
installation cost: $ 111.51
integration cost: $ 318.60
TAC (TEMPEST, HEMP)
TACs handle up to 16 terminals. There is a base cost
associated with a TAC in addition to a cost for each TAC
port that is used by a terminal. The TACs are assumed to
meet Tempest and HEMP requirements.
base hardware cost: $7500.00
additional hardware cost per port: $ 250.00
base maintenance cost (per month): $ 131.25
added maintenance cost per port (per month): $ 4.38
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base installation cost: $ 393.75
added installation cost per port: $ 13.13
KG-84
The KG-84 costs are computed in a different manner from
other elements. In particular, it is assumed that monthly
maintenance costs equal .5% of the hardware cost and that
the installation cost is 1.5% of the hardware cost. There
is no additional integration cost for the KG.
base hardware cost: $5000.00
maintenance cost (per month) $ 25.00
installation cost: $ 75.00
IPLI (TEMPEST, HEMP)
The IPLI includes a KG-84. The prices below are for the
IPLI alone, exclusive of the KG.
base hardware cost: $15000.00
maintenance cost (per month): $ 262.50
installation cost: $ 787.50
The cost of an IPLI with a KG is therefore:
base hardware cost: $20000.00
maintenance cost (per month): $ 287.50
installation cost: $ 862:50
MODEMS ( HEMP
)
The unit costs for modems are as follows:
Speed Cost Maintenance Installation Integration
(per month)
300 $1835.00 $32.11 $96.34 $275.25
1200 $1965.00 $34.39 $103.16 $294.75
2400 $2885.00 $50.49 $151 .46 $432.75
4800 $4416.00 $77.28 $231 .84 $662.40
9600 $6221.00 $108.87 $326.60 $933.15
C/30 IMP (TEMPEST, HEMP)
There is a base cost for a C/30 plus a cost for <
port used by ho:sts TACs or trunk:5 •
each
base hardware cost: $44636.00
added hardware cost per port: $ 152.00
base maintenance cost (per month): $ 781.13
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added maintenance cost per port (per month): $ 2.66
base installation cost: $ 2343.39
added installation cost per port: $ 7.98
LINE COSTS
All lines less than or equal to 9600 bps are priced
according to the ATT 3002 tariff. Wideband lines (19.2 and
56 Kbps) are priced according to the DDS tariff with 19.2
Kbps lines priced exactly as 56 Kbps lines. Installation
costs are not considered in computing line costs.
There are two components to the tariffs used by the
design algorithms: a fixed monthly charge and a mileage
dependent charge. The tariffs as provided by DCA are as
follows:
Speed = 110, 150, 300, 1200, 2400, 4000, 4800, 9600
Fixed Component = $105.34
miles 1-15 2.55 per mile
miles 16-25 2.13 per mile
miles 26-100 1 .59 per mile
miles 101-1000 .93 per mile
miles 1000- .57 per mile
Speed = 19200, 56000
Fixed Component = $1271.20
miles 1-15 $12.75 per mile
miles 16-25 $10.65 per mile
miles 26-100 $ 7.95 per mile
miles 101-1000 $ 4.65 per mile
miles 1000- $ 2.85 per mile
EXPANSION FACTORS FOR OVERSEAS TARIFFS
To compute the cost of a line for which at least one
terminus is not within CONUS, the costs given in the
previous section are multiplied by an expansion factor for
the first 1000 miles. Line cost for the portion of the line
greater than 1000 miles, are calculated using CONUS tariffs.
The expansion factors were provided to the design teams.
The expansion factor used depends upon the line's endpoints.
For this purpose, the world is divided into three areas,
defined as follows:
CONUS: 65 < longitude < 164
Pacific 1 64 < longitude < 1 80
-180 < longitude < -60
Europe -60 < longitude < 65
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The expansion factors for lines are:









INTERNET PROTOCOL FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATION
A summary of the contents of the internet header follows:
Version IHL Type of Service Total Length
Identification Flags Fragment Offset




Figure 22. Example Internet Datagram Header
Version: 4 bits
The Version field indicates the format of the internet
header. This document describes version 4.
IHL: 4 bits
Internet Header Length is the length of the internet
header in 32 bit words, and thus points to the beginning of
the data.
Type of Service: 8 bits
The Type of Service provides an indication of the
abstract parameters of the quality of service desired.
These parameters are to be used to guide the selection of
the actual service parameters when transmitting a datagram
through a particular network. Several networks offer
service precedence, which somehow treats high precedence
traffic as more important than other traffic. A few
networks offer s Stream service, whereby one can achieve a
smoother service at some cost. Typically this involves the
reservation of resources within the network. Another choice
involves a low-delay vs. high-reliability trade off.
Typically networks invoke more complex (and delay producing)
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mechanisms as the need for reliability increases. The type
of service is used to specify the treatment of the datagram
during its transmission through the internet system as
follows:
Bits 0-2:: Precedence.
Bit 3:: Stream or Datagram.
Bits 4-5:: Reliability.
Bit 6:: Speed over Reliability
Bit 7:\ Speed.
Total Length: 16 bits
Total Length is the length of the datagram, measured in
octets, including internet header and data.
Identification: 16 bits
An identifying value assigned by the sender to aid in
assembling fragments of a datagram.
Flags: 3 bits
Various Control Flags.
Bit 0: reserved, must be zero
Bit 1: Don't Fragment This Datagram (DF).
Bit 2: More Fragments Flag (MF).
Fragment Offset: 13 bits
This field indicates where in the datagram this fragment
belongs. The fragment offset is measured in units of 8
octets (64 bits). First fragment has offset zero.
Time to Live: 8 bits
This field indicates the maximum time the datagram is
allowed to remain in the internet system. If this field
contains the value zero then the datagram should be
destroyed. This field is modified in internet header
processing. The time is measured in units of seconds. The
intention is to cause unde 1 iverable datagrams to be
discarded.
Protocol: 8 bits
This field indicates the next level protocol used in the
data portion of the internet datagram.
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Header Checksum: 16 bits
A checksum on the header only. Since some header fields
may change (e.g., time to live), this is recomputed and
verified at each point that the internet header is
processed.
Source Address: 32 bits
The source address. The first octet is the Source
Network, and the following three octets are the Source Local
Address
.
Destination Address: 32 bits
The destination address. The first octet is the
Destination Network, and the following three octets are the
Destination Local Address.
Options: variable
The option field is variable in length. There may be
zero or no options. There are two cases for the format of
an option:
Case 1 : A single octet of option-type.
Case 2: An option-type octet, an option-length octet,
and the actual option-data octets.
The option classes are:
= control
1 = internet error
2 = experimental debugging and measurement




TRANSMISSION CONTROL PROTOCOL FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATION
TCP segments are sent as internet datagrams. The
Internet Protocol header carries several information fields,
including the source and destination host addresses. A TCP
header follows the internet header, supplying information
specific to the TCP protocol. This division allows for the
existence of host level protocols other than TCP.
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Figure 23. TCP Header Format
Source Port: 16 bits
The source port number.
Destination Port: 16 bits
The destination port number.
Sequence Number: 32 bits
The sequence number of the first data octet in this
segment (except when SYN is present).
101

Acknowledgment Number: 32 bits
If the ACK control bit is set this field contains the
value of the next sequence number the sender of the segment
is expecting to receive. Once a connection is established
this is always sent.
Data Offset: 4 bits
The number of 32 bit words in the TCP Header. This
indicates where the data begins. The TCP header including
options is an integral number of 32 bits long.
Reserved: 6 bits
Reserved for future use. Must be zero.
Control Bits: 8 bits (from left to right):
URG: Urgent Pointer field significant
ACK: Acknowledgment field significant
EOL: End of Letter
RST: Reset the connection
SYN: Synchronize sequence numbers
FIN: No more data from sender
Window: 16 bits
The number of data octets beginning with the one
indicated in the acknowledgment field which the sender of
this segment is willing to accept.
Checksum: 16 bits
The checksum field is the 1 6 bit one's complement of the
one's complement sum of all 16 bit words in the header and
text. If a segment contains an odd number of header and
text octets to be checksummed, the last octet is padded on
the right with zeros to form a 16 bit work for checksum
purposes.
The checksum also covers a 96 bit pseudo header
conceptually prefixed to the TCP header. This pseudo header
contains the Source Address, the Destination Address, the
Protocol, and TCP length. This gives the TCP protection
against misrouted segments. This information is carried in
the Internet Protocol and is transferred across the
TCP/Network interface in the arguments or results of calls
by the TCP on the IP.
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Urgent Pointer: 16 bits
This field communicates the current value of the urgent
pointer as positive offset from the sequence number in this
segment. The urgent pointer points to the sequence number
of the octet following the urgent data. This field should
only be interpreted in segment with the URG control bit set.
Options: variable
Options may occupy space at the end of the TCP header
and are a multiple of 8 bits in length. All options are
included in the checksum. An option may begin on any octet
boundary. There are two cases for the format of an option:
Case 1 : A single octet of option-kind.
Case 2: An octet of option-kind, an octet of option-
length, and the actual option-data octets.
Currently defined options include (kind indicated in octal):
Kind Length Meaning
- End of option list.
1 - No-Operation.
100 - Reserved.
105 4 Buffer Size.
Padding: variable
The TCP header padding is used to ensure that the TCP
header ends and data begins on a 32 bit boundary. The
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